A safety-critical programme usually needs three suppliers: one to write the ISO documentation, one to write the firmware, and one to design the board. We do all three ourselves, which removes the two handoffs where programmes lose the most time.
Our engineering work goes back more than fifteen years across automotive and industrial programmes, covering functional safety, cybersecurity, embedded software, and power electronics hardware. Keeping all four in-house is the whole point of this page.
In a split programme, a consultancy writes the hazard analysis and leaves. Months later a hardware firm lays out the board and a software house writes the firmware, neither having been in the room for the ASIL decisions. At the end the consultancy returns to assemble a safety case for a design it never saw take shape, and every assumption from the first phase has to be re-verified against a product nobody in that room touched.
We run the whole chain instead. The engineer who wrote the hazard analysis reviews the schematic and signs off the test evidence.
Nobody has to carry a requirement between a consultant who cannot read a schematic and a vendor who has not read the standard. That job disappears.
A safety requirement the hardware cannot meet gets caught while the block diagram is still a block diagram, rather than during validation.
When an assessor raises a gap there is no discussion about whose scope it fell into.
The practice is led by an engineer holding a doctorate in electrical engineering. The certifications below are issued to individuals rather than to companies, which is why they are listed by qualification: credential IDs and issuer verification links are provided during supplier qualification.