Security & Reliability Diagnostics
SYSTEM · Zone Architecture Gateway to EV Powertrain · Rev 2.1
Critical Threats (CAL 4)
0
T-01 OTA · T-02 Bus Injection
Mitigation Coverage
0
ISO/SAE 21434 Controls
Top Event PMHF — H-01
0
FIT · Target < 10 · random HW only
Minimal Cut Sets
0
Basic Event Failure Paths
Threat Analysis & Risk Assessment (TARA)
ISO/SAE 21434| ID | Threat Scenario | STRIDE | Impact | Feasibility | Vector | CAL | R155 A5 | Treatment | Mitigation Status |
|---|
Risk Value Matrix
ISO/SAE 21434 §15.8 · Impact × FeasibilityATTACK FEASIBILITY →
Low (1)
Med (2)
High (3)
V.High (4)
Negligible
1
1
2
2
Moderate
1
2
3
3
Major
2
3
4
4
Severe
2
3
T-01 · T-02
5
↑ IMPACT (Safety / Financial / Operational / Privacy)
Risk values drive treatment decisions (§15.9). CAL is assigned separately from impact
category and attack vector per ISO/SAE 21434 Annex E — see Vector / CAL columns in the TARA.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) & Minimal Cut Sets
Top Event: H-01 (Unintended Acceleration)Unintended Torque > 2Nm (H-01)
Top event: — · Target ≤ 10 FIT
Hardware Random Failure
Σλres = —
(three basic events)
(three basic events)
Inverter MCU Failure
λ = 4.2 FIT (DC = 98%)
Gate Driver Stuck-On
λ = 2.2 FIT (DC = 95%)
Resolver Sensor Path
λ = 0.9 FIT (DC = 98%)
Systematic / Cyber Attack
Qualitative
excluded from PMHF
excluded from PMHF
Gateway Boundary Bypass
SecOC Bypass (T-02)
Torque Cmd Injection
Plausibility Check Fails
Minimal Cut Sets
computed by MOCUS from the tree above—
| Cut set | Order | Basic events | Rate |
|---|
norxs · Security & Reliability Platform · Demo environment — simulated data · norxs.com
Safety × Security Co-Engineering — Trade-off Register
ISO 26262 ∩ ISO/SAE 21434| Interaction | Security Side | Safety Side | Resolution |
|---|
Conflicts between cybersecurity controls and safety mechanisms are tracked as interaction items and resolved jointly
per ISO 26262-2 §5.4.5.5 and ISO/SAE 21434 §5.4.2 — not negotiated after the fact.